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1  Introduction
Corporatization  is a hybrid organizational forn,  between governrment  ownership
and privatization that seeks to improve efficiency and reduce transfers (and costs) in a
publicly  owned  agency.  Corporatization  is  a  brand  of  decentralization  in  that  it
reallocates decision-making authority from the central administration to lower levels of
the public sector.  After a brief overview of decentralization and corporatization in public
health,  this  paper  analyzes  the  role  of  governance  and  incentives  in  corporatized
hospitals.  The analysis focuses on the design of public hospital corporate boards, the
institutional lynchpin of such systems.  Drawing on Dixit's  (1996) multitasking common-
agency model  as a  conceptual  lens, I propose  a manner  of assessing the institutional
design of corporatized hospital boards.  I analyze the extent to which the Dixit model
explains factors salient to such boards, and point to other factors that come into play.  I
conclude  with  some policy  implications  for the reform  of the public  hospital  law in
Lebanon.  1
In part 2, I discuss the role of decentralization and corporatization in public health
reform to indicate the institutional structure that has recently been promoted in a number
of countries. In part 3, I introduce the multitasking common agency model and map it
onto the problem of hospital board design.  I also describe the initial data collected to
carry out  the  analysis.  I introduce  the  case  of  Lebanon  in  part  4  and  discuss  the
objectives of  the reform  as well  as the principal  features of the institutional  structure
governing corporatized hospitals. In parts S and 6, I discuss the coordination and agency
I  Passed in 1996, analysis of this law (Eid 1998) revealed that its design is weak in some key areas
that make it difficult to implement.  In a policy note addressed to the Ministry of Health, I recommend its
amendment - a project currently underway.  See Appendix A.3
problems emanating from the design of corporatized hospitals in Lebanon and offer some
ideas for the reform of the system.
2  Decentralization in public health care provision
There are three possible types of government involvement in health: regulation,
finance and service provision.  Regulatory  functions include decisions on the rules of
system configuration  and the definition  of respective roles  for the public  and private
sector.  Finance functions determine the extent of universal health coverage using public
funds.  The  government may also be  involved in  direct  provision  of services,  as the
owner  and  manager  of  hospitals  and  primary  care  services.  The  limits  of  private
initiative in the delivery of public goods and political constraints on privatization are the
two main factors behind public health provision.
Two principal schools of thought have developed  in answer to  the question of
how to increase efficiency in public service provision, health included.  On the one hand,
it is argued that efficiency and performance are more important than ownership, and that
good management is key (e.g., Moore  1996; Barzelay 1992).  As such, hiring innovative
managers with the right technical and leadership skills and introducing  the appropriate
("private sector-like") management systems improve efficiency.  On the other hand, it is
argued that the public sector has inherent inefficiencies due to the nature of the goods it
provides and to the limited power of incentives it can offer, and that the size of the public
sector is better  reduced  to  a minimum  through  the  transfer  of responsibilities  to  the
private  sector where  possible  (Wilson  1989, Kikeri, Nellis  &  Shirley  1992; Schleifer
1998).  From this  perspective, privatization  is the preferred  option  for better  service
delivery.  Advocates of  corporatization take  a middle  ground as a point  of departure,4
namely that both the public sector and the market are capable of failure, necessitating the
search for organizational  forms that reduce inefficiencies on both  sides.  In designing
such organizational forms, incentives and coordination are key levers.
Public ownership implies, in practice, various constraints on the management of
facilities.  Personnel are usually civil servants and procurement procedures are subject to
system-wide  rigid  rules.  Therefore, an  inevitable  effect  of  public  ownership  is  less
flexibility in adapting to  local conditions, and 'low powered'  incentives.  Tirole (1994)
considers four reasons why the 'power'  of incentive schemes tends to be 'low'  in public
sector agencies: a) the multiplicity of goals and the difficulty of their measurement; b) the
unavailability of benchmarks  for comparisons; c)  the heterogeneity  of owners; and d)
property dispersion.  Holmstr6m (1994) arrives at similar results with  respect to  large
organizations: in developing  systems to manage  diverse sets of activities, they tend to
damnpen  incentives and quell innovation.
Coordination issues are also extremely important when agents have low-powered
incentives, since discretionality  and  autonomy can lead to poor  performance, such  as
shirking.  Resolving coordination issues relates to institutional design. 2 A central element
of  design  is  the  allocation  of  residual  control  rights  (or  decision  rights),  between
centralization and decentralization. 3 An inevitable trade-off exists between centralization
2  Throughout  this  paper,  I  use  North's  (1990)  distinction  between  "institutions"  and
"organizations".  Institutions  are the formal and  informal rules that  shape interaction.  They range  from
constitutions, to laws, to common practice to corporate culture (Kreps 1993).  Organizations are groups of
individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve a given set of objectives.  They include political,
economnic,  social and  educational bodies.  In  this proposal,  a hospital is an  organization.  The law  and
decrees governing the operation of the hospital are a set of institutions.
3  'Residual control rights'  over an asset are defined by Hart (1995) as "the right to decide all usages
of the asset in any way not inconsistent with  a prior  contract,  custom, or law  ... possession of residual
control rights  is taken  virtually to  be  the  definition  of  ownership  ...  in contrast to  the  more standard
definition of  ownership, whereby  an  owner possesses  the residual income  from  an asset  rather than  its5
and lack of efficiency, and decentralization and lack of monitoring.  Coordination seeks
to minimize this trade-off.
Studies of organizational boundaries consider two elements in the decentralizalion
of decision rights (Holmstrom 1995; Hart  1995; Milgrom and Roberts  1992; and Kreps
1992). First,  those with  authority must  also bear the responsibility  for their  decisions
because  the  alignment  of  authority  and  responsibility  creates  incentives  for  optirnal
decision  making.  Second,  coordination  is  important  in  ensuring  that  organizations
allocate the authority to make decisions to the agents best informed to make them.  'I'he
benefits and costs of decentralization have been well studied.
Table 1. Benefits and costs of decentralization
Benefits  Costs
Better use of information  at the local level  Agency  costs
Lower  response  time in adapting  to local  Coordination  costs
conditions
Increased  motivation  of managers  Costs of communication  between  central  and
local units
Source: Brickley, J. et al. 1997. Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, Irwin.
In health service delivery, organizational boundaries are in  flux throughout  the
world,  because  of  changes in  medical  technology,  know-how,  and  costs,  resulting  in
differential  changes in  transaction costs  (Robinson  1996).  Organizational  boundaries
have also been in flux because policy-makers have deliberately experimented with new
residual  control rights"  (pp.30).  Residual  control  rights  are  also  referred  to  as  'decision  rights'  by
Holmstr6m (1995), Milgrom and Roberts (1992), and Kreps (1992).  The latter, shorter term is used more
frequently in this paper.6
organizational forms to solve the agency and coordination problems outlined above.  In
the  US  private  health  sector,  for  instance,  vertical  disintegration  and  horizontal
integration  have  been  the  two  prominent  trends  in  managed  care  (Robinson  1999).
Numerous industrialized and developing countries are experimenting with the separation
of funding from provision functions, with the aim of improving efficiency (Govindaraj &
Chawla,  1996).  One  of the  main  institutional  responses to  this  effort  has been the
corporatization of public hospitals.
2.1  Corporatization and its implications in public hospital reform.
Corporatization seeks to retain public sector ownership of hospitals, but to reduce
their cost by: (a) granting them revenue-raising capacity, and; (b) changing the incentive
structure  at  the  local  level,  including  the  level  of  risk  incurred  by  hospitals.  By
transferring  decision  rights  over  finance  and  management  to  the  level  of  hospital
managers, corporatization also seeks to improve the quality of public health provision.
However, unlike what happens in private health provision, corporatization cannot achieve
a complete transfer of risk to the provider (hospital).  Because financial risk continues to
be consolidated at the level of the national public sector, among the difficult issues in the
design of corporatization is the decentralization of decisions rights in a way that transfers
a sufficient degree of financial risk to the corporatized entity, to improve performance.
Under  corporatization,  public  hospitals  are  generally  required  to  develop  a
revenue-raising  capacity  through  user  fees.  However,  the  incentive  to  raise  funds
depends  on  the  role  and  structure  of  health  insurance  coverage.  Under  universal
coverage, hospitals receive a transfer from the public budget.  The design  of hospital7
finance  options  ranges  from  (a)  an  allocation  estimated  based  on transfers  made  in
previous  years,  and  (b)  a performance  contract.  In  the  former case, the hospital  is
designed as an administrative unit similar to any arn  of the central administration.  In  the
second  case,  when  establishing  a performance  contract, the  central  administration  or
sector  aims  at  setting  the  goals  and  expected  budget  and  empowers  decisions  and
responsibility at the level of the hospital (Harding & Preker 1999).
The impact of performance contracts has been mixed (World Bank 1995; Shirley
1999). Since there is no significant transfer of risk, the real effect on incentives depends
on multiple factors that go beyond the definition of the contract.  As an example of the
range of options under this arrangement, the hospital manager reports to the Minister of
Health in some cases, while he/she reports to a board of directors in other cases.  Further
complicating this sort of arrangement is the difficulty of monitoring hospital directors and
board  members in the presence of political intervention.  As  a result, especially when
performance contracts  are present, the design and effectiveness of hospital  governance
institutions  are  key,  and  depend  on  the  following  types  of  factors,  currently  being
4 grappled with.
*  Consistency  between  the  proclaimed  objectives  of  corporatization  and
organizational design, i.e., where on the gamut between administrative units
and performance contracts the system lies;
4  These questions are of special interest  given the international trend toward decentralization and
corporatization of the public sector, and given the apparent difficulty of designing effective public hospital
boards in both industrialized  and developing  countries (Govindaraj  & Chawla,  1996; Barnum & Katzin,
1993; Shonick & Romer,  1983, Savage et. al.,  1997; Schleifer & Vishney, 1997; Gertner & Kaplan,  1996).
It is curious that despite the wide interest in this topic, there is little theory that informs it.8
*  Whether  key  stakeholders/principals are represented  on hospital  governing
boards and how much influence they wield;
*  Requisite alignment of the incentives of the agent, or hospital manager, with
those of the principals, and, by extension, alignment of the objective function
of the hospital with that of the sector - a coordination problem that impacts
both the quality and cost of service provision;
*  Adequacy of the power of incentives given intended outcomes.
In what follows, I discuss the relevance of some agency models to understanding
incentives and coordination in the institutional design of corporatized public hospitals. 5 I
then evaluate the incentives that the system in Lebanon has provided for hospital boards
of directors to be responsive to the objectives of their stakeholders, of which there are at
least  two  sets  --  the  health  sector's  regulators  of  public  hospitals  and  community
members/hospital users in their areas.
3  Conceptualizing the corporate governance  ofpublic  hospitals
Dixit's  formulation of the problem of governance in the public sector builds on
two seminal models in the field of organization economics.  The first is the multitasking
model,  developed by  Holmstrom  and  Milgrom  (1991).  In  this  model,  an  agent  has
several tasks that compete, at least partly, for the agent's  attention and effort.  Because
5  I use the terms institutions, institutional structure, institutional design, laws and their decrees of
application interchangeably in this paper. A comprehensive treatment of institutions would normally cover
problems  of  implementation,  enforcement,  and  monitoring  in  addition  to  issues  of  design  (structure)
(Polenske  1999). For the sake of narrowing and deepening the scope of this research, I focus on issues of
design, which are most  amenable  to the analysis  of decrees - an important component  of my data and
policy problem.  I  will bring  in issues  of  implementation, enforcement,  and  monitoring insofar as  they
enlighten the problem of design, but they will not be the focus of the discussion.9
the agent's  priorities  over tasks  are not certain to  correspond with  the principal's,  the
latter devises  an incentive  scheme  to influence the agent's  allocation  of effort.  The
choice of incentive scheme depends on the degree of observability of inputs and outputs,
and on the differences  in values between the agent and the principal.  Two important
results  derive from the Holmstrom/Milgrom model:  (1) If the output from one task is
poorly  observable,  compared  with  output from  a  competing  task,  then the  incentive
scheme for the competing task must have lower power (i.e., the reward must be less) to
avoid excessive diversion of effort from this task to the more observable one(s);  (2) If
some tasks are primarily of value to the agent (as compared with the principal), and can
be controlled by being prohibited altogether, then it may be preferable for the principal to
prohibit  them,  rather  than  attempt  to  provide  stronger  incentive  schemes  for  the
performance of other tasks.
Bemheim and Whinston (1986) consider the problem of one agent with more than
one principal. The agent may work on the basis of explicit delegation by principals, or by
intrinsic  assignment (when  the  agent takes decisions that  affect several principals).  If
principals cooperate, or agree on goals and coordinating incentives, the result is similar to
having a single principal.  If principals do not agree on goals, then actions by the agent
may  be  biased  to  those  principals  providing  greater  incentives,  otherwise  the  mean
behavior by the agent would be to satisfy all principals at the same level.
Dixit  combines  the  two  models  to  show  that  the  combination  of  multiple
principals and multiple tasks results, perforce, in low-powered incentive schemes.  His
model is based on the intuition that in such situations, each principal will try to free ride
on the  incentives provided  by  the other(s).  The multitasking  common  agency model10
predicts  that  given unobservable  effort, an  agent  will exert  second best  effort if  the
principals are united and third best effort if the principals do not act cooperatively.  Under
non-cooperative  arrangements,  even though a  given principal j  may not be  concerned
with  any other components of  the agent's  output but  those of interest to j,  principal j
would  prefer  that  the agent  exert less effort  in other dimensions because  that would
induce the agent to make more effort in the dimension that benefits j.  In equilibrium, a
situation  with  multiple  principals  and  multiple  tasks  yields  low-powered  incentive
schemes because  some of the incentive provided by principal j to  the agent results in
benefits to  other principals  as well.  This "leakage"  makes it much less desirable for
principal j  to offer a powerful incentive scheme.  Given unobservable effort, improving
on this outcome involves better coordination of principals, an important potential lever in
the design  of public  sector organizations, especially  given the difficulty of providing
high-powered incentives.
3.1  Mapping the model onto the problem of hospital board design
In  applying the multitasking  common  agency model, we  consider the hospital
manager or CEO as the agent.  This agent has several principals  (stakeholders) such as
the MOH (tutelage sector) on one end and the community on the other, as well as doctors,
licensed employees, unions, etc. . some or all of whom can be represented on the hospital
board.  To simplify, we take a case where the manager has two principals, and assume
they are the MOH and the community.  The MOH's  primary objective is to reduce the
costs of the sector given minimum standards of quality -- a goal partly achieved through
reductions in transfers for public health provision.  The more a hospital gets its financial
house in order, through cost-recovery and cost-effective service provision, the closer theI1
MOH gets to fulfilling this objective.  The communities dependent on public hospitals
have  different  and  potentially  conflicting  objectives.  Public  hospital  users,  or
"stakeholders" (Savage et. al., 1997), want the best possible care at the lowest possible
price,  especially  since  the  previous  system  provided  the  possibility  of  universal
coverage.6  Prima facie, the objectives of these two principals are in conflict under the
new law in Lebanon.
A further dimension is the agent's tasks.  To simplify, we assume that the hospital
manager  under  the new  law has two main  tasks: to  control costs  and to  improve the
quality of health care provision.  The former of these tasks is easily measurable while the
latter is not, but has important equity implications.  A similar question about the incentive
tradeoffs between prospective payment  and cost reimbursement systems in  the United
States has been analyzed by Ma (1994) using the multitask agency approach (Holmstrom
& Milgrom 1991).  In this model, the hospital allocates its efforts between cost reduction
and quality enhancement.  Along similar lines, this approach allows for an analysis of the
extent to which hospitals in Lebanon, in having to internalize their production costs once
corporatized, risk  resorting to excessive cost  reduction, and compromising  quality.  A
desirable objective of design would be for corporatized hospitals to internalize the benefit
of quality as well.
For any  given public  hospital,  it is clear that  controlling costs will be  a more
measurable task than the improvement of the quality of health care provision.  It remains
to be established whether principals are united in their demands on the agent or not.  In a
6  The idea of considering  hospital  users  and/or  the "community"  in general  as "stakeholders"  or
principals  is fairly prevalent  in the healthcare  literature. Among  the possible  hospital  stakeholders12
micro-organizational setting such as a public hospital, this task is more difficult than for
the macro-policy-making  example of GATT, illustrated by Dixit  (1996).  Deterrnining
the degree of principal coordination can be done by looking at the principals'  channels of
influence, in terms of (1) appointment rights, i.e., rights principals possess because of the
manner  in which  they came  to occupy their positions, and; (2) decision rights  or the
formal  and  informal  prerogatives  of  principals  once  they  are appointed  to  a board,
defined by law and convention.  To simplify, the main difference between rights (1) and
(2) is that the former yield power that emanates from the person, while the latter yield
power connected with  the position.  Empirically, this difference is important as I will
illustrate.
Take the example of appointment rights.  There are cases, where the strength of
appointment rights  granted,  differs.  For  instance,  a  local  political  appointment  to  a
hospital  board  will  enjoy  a  more  powerful  appointment  right  than  a  politically  un-
connected community member.  A political nominee  to the board  would  also enjoy a
more powerful  appointment right than a physician who sits on the board representing
medical staff in the hospital, but who is not affiliated with the local political leadership in
the area.
There  are  other  cases,  where  a  principal  is  not  granted  a  decision  right  all
together, as the following example illustrates: By definition, any public agency has at
least two sets of principals, the governmental body (or sectoral tutelage) in charge of it,
and  its taxpaying beneficiaries  (or community).  If both  principals  are present on the
enumerated by Savage (1997) and Tucker & Burr (1990) are patients and local commnunities,  state and local
governments, health plans, professional/trade associations, physicians, and employers.13
board, they  may or may not be  coordinated.  When a  public hospital board  does not
contain  a member  of the community, it cannot be representative of it.  Therefore, by
virtue of the  fact that an important principal (in this case a community representative)
does not sit on the board, the board would not embody the interests of both principals.  In
such a  case, principals  can be  considered to  be  un-coordinated because  an  important
principal does not enjoy an appointment right at all.
Such cases  from  Lebanon  shed interesting light on  how the manner  in  which
stakeholder representatives come to sit on a board influences the decisions they are able
to make.  This case also offers an opportunity to analyze the currency of influence behind
the  differential  capacity  of  principals  to  provide  incentives  to  the  agent,  and  the
circumstances under which a given principal may choose to exert influence 7. I analyze
the institutional design implications of the Lebanese system in section 5 of this paper.
By analyzing the problem of public hospital board formation in Lebanon using
this approach, I try to answer the following questions:
. If  the  key  principals  of  public  hospitals  can  be  considered  to  be
"uncoordinated", what sorts of outcomes can be expected, and how well does
the empirical evidence to date corroborate predicted outcomes?
. What  can  be  done  about  the  structure,  prerogatives,  and  manner  of
appointment of a board to increase coordination among principals?
*  To what extent is better coordination of principals  likely to improve the
system?
*  Dixit's  model  assumes  equal  power  on  the  part  of  the  principals  to
influence the agent.  Empirically, we observe significant differential powers ro
7  Aghion  and  Tirole's  (1997)  work  on  the  difference  between  formal  and  real  authority  in
organizations describes simnilar  empirical outcomes.14
influence the agent, both through appointment rights and (post-appointment)
decision rights allocations.  Can the design of governance institutions (boards)
account and correct for skewed distributions of power?
3.2  Data
The conclusions of this paper are based on open-ended and structured interviews,
analysis of documents, and draft and published legislation.  Hospital budgets, accounts
and strategic plans (where available) were also drawn on in the analysis.  Between March
and September of 1998, I benefited from permission to take part in weekly meetings of
the Ministry of Health (MOH) Task Force on Public Hospitals as a participant observer. 8
My presence  in  these meetings  was  crucial to  understanding the  sectoral  and  macro
dimensions  of  public  hospital  reform  in  Lebanon,  and  the  day-to-day  obstacles
encountered in implementation.  During the summer of 1999, I benefited from permission
to  accompany  the  MOH  Ratings  Commission  to  inspect  hospitals  and  assess  their
standards.  Because these visits included public and private hospitals, they were central to
understanding the uniform vision for quality and performance that the MOH has for both
types of hospitals under the new, corporatized regime.
During the summer of 1997 and the Spring of 1998, two rounds of introductory,
then open-ended interviews were carried out.  These were with the Director General of
the Ministry of Health, the Minister's  advisor in  charge of legal matters,  four middle
managers  in  the  MOH  in  charge  of  public  hospital  management  and  finance  (the
Directorate of Medical  Care), procurement (the Procurement Division)  and accounting
(the Accounting Division), and a total of 6 directors and board members of the three first
hospitals slated for corporatization - Nabatiyye,  Tannourine and  Qartaba.  Along with15
many other things,  the tradition of  serious research  on the  public  sector disappeared
during  the  war  in  Lebanon.  Introductory  interviews were  crucial  in  explaining my
professional  affiliations, and establishing a rapport with my interviewees.  Substantive
discussions would typically begin with a second meeting.
Another series  of interviews was carried out during the Spring and Summer of
1999, with  11 board members  and directors of newly corporatized hospitals, this time
using  a  specific set  of questions  developed based  on Provision #14  of the Decree on
Finance and based on Provisions #9-11 of the Decree on Personnel.  These interviews
lasted two hours on average, and began with an explanation of the approach, including
definitions of decision rights  and decision rights allocations to ensure that interviewees
had  a  uniform  understanding  of both  the  approach  and  the questions.  Some  of the
interviews were carried out in two parts or supplemented with an additional interview for
clarifications.  Also interviewed were the current Minister of Health, Karam Karam and
his advisors in charge of public hospitals.
Implementation of Law #544 began in 1998, once the decrees were drafted.  To
date, only four out of 17 public hospitals have begun to function under the new regime.
These cases form the empirical evidence this paper is based on.  Because of the dire need
for public health provision in Lebanon, the nomination of further boards of directors for
public hospitals is underway, and more hospitals are expected to adopt the system in the
next year.  However, the intention of the MOH is to amend the hospital corporatization
decrees.  In the meantime, some of the information I have obtained on the weaknesses of
the system and used as empirical evidence in this paper, constitutes criticism of sectoral
8  See Pomper (1991) and Jorgensen (1989) for a review of the benefits and constraints of participant
observation as a qualitative research method.16
structures  and  policies  by  people  employed  in  the  sector,  and  can  compromise  the
professional positions of its sources.  As a result, the names of both individuals and their
affiliations are kept confidential in this version of the paper, as the reform proceeds.  The
hospitals corporatized to date are Nabatiyye, Qartaba, Dahr el-Bachek, and Tannourine.
The eleven board members and directors interviewed are from these hospitals, but their
names are referenced in this paper as numbers (1-11), and their affiliations are omitted.
The objective of this paper is not to arrive at incontrovertible conclusions about
the system in Lebanon, nor are such conclusions possible  given the limited sample of
hospitals corporatized to date.  Instead, this paper seeks to explore ways of understanding
the problem  of board  design,  in  anticipation of  a time,  in  the near  future, when  the
empirical evidence from Lebanon and elsewhere will be richer and both the application
of models and the conclusions can be more definitive.
4  The case of Lebanon:  Background and policy  reform
The  Lebanese  public  hospital  sector  experienced  a period  of  deterioration  in
coverage, quality of service and financial management during the war from 1974-1990.
By 1990 the sector was providing a set of perverse incentives. For instance:
. Incentives for uninsured patients to  seek expensive private care because the
quality of care at public hospitals was low and provision  was erratic.  The Ministry of
MOH had begun to reimburse uninsured patients who sought private care during the war
in order to ensure that all those in need of health care were able to get it without having to
travel during battles.  Given that the uninsured constitute 44% percent of the population,
this policy resulted in  a rapid escalation of public health  expenditures,  77% of which17
went toward the purchase of medical services from the private sector in 1994, when the
reform was launched (MOH reports and data).
*  Incentives  created  by  the  cost  reimbursement  system,  for  physicians  to
choose to hospitalize patients  for interventions that could be provided on an outpatient
basis, and for hospitals to use high-cost interventions when lower-cost treatments would
be  sufficient.  Not  surprisingly,  cost  reimbursement  also created  incentives for  over-
billing, especially given expected and actual arrears on the part of the MOH.
. In  the  public  hospitals,  eroded  public-sector  wages  and  compressed  pay
scales.  These created incentives for public hospital staff to absent themselves from their
positions, and seek employment in the private sector in order to supplement their income.
*  Weak  incentives  and  meager  means  for  hospitals  to  gather  and  use
information  that  would  improve  their  performance,  and  an  even  weaker  regulatory
capacity at the level of the Ministry of Health to oversee the operation of public hospitals.
*  No consumer protection policies, and therefore weak incentives on the part of
hospitals to ensure that they were satisfying community needs and equity considerations.
Despite  the  possibility  of  government  reimbursement,  poor  patients  have  difficulty
accessing private hospital services, and when they do receive care, they are often asked
for significant co-payments.  Those who were most politically connected benefited most
from the cost reimbursement system.
4.1  The declared objectives of the reform
As part  of the effort to  restructure  the public  health  sector, a  law was  drafted to
corporatize public hospitals by granting them a degree of fiscal and managerial autonomy18
Corporatization  grants public hospitals their own governing board,  thereby delegating
some of the regulatory authority of the MOH, but retains the MOH as residual claimant
on the hospitals.  As part of their autonomous status, hospitals have the right to charge
patients  for  their  services  to  develop  a  revenue  base  that  would  gradually  replace
transfers received from the MOH.  The objective of the law on public hospital autonomy
is to provide:
*  Incentives for hospitals to improve the quality  of care they offer while
keeping  costs  under  control,  thereby  satisfying  the  health  sector's  equity
objective of providing good quality affordable health care for low-income and
uninsured patients;
*  Incentives for hospital management to be responsive to the sector's  cost
reduction  priorities.  Making hospitals financially autonomous reduces (and
eventually stops) the need for transfers;
O  Incentives for hospitals to be more attuned and responsive to specific local
needs, especially in preventive and basic health care.
Central  to  how  well  hospitals  achieve  these  objectives  is  hospital  board
effectiveness in regulating the activities of their hospitals.  The design and prerogatives of
hospital boards, discussed later, are therefore key.
Under the new, corporatized  system, hospitals  sign a  service contract with  the
MOH,  civil  service  bureaus  (e.g.,  the  army  and  internal  security  administrations),
insurance companies and other private purchasers.  Hospital own-source revenue is raised
through  private  sector  purchases  and  through  patient  contributions  to  the  price  of
treatment partly  covered  by the  MOH.  Under  the new  cost-sharing rules,  uninsured
(MOH) patients are required to pay 5% of the price of treatment at public hospitals, while
the MOH contributes the remaining 85% - effectively "purchasing" services from its own19
hospitals.9 The new system continues to provide universal insurance for the time being.
Eventually, benefits (or MOH contract privileges) will become means-tested in the sense
that public  hospitals that do not  break-even will cease to  operate.")  Hospitals are to
prepare and agree upon an annual Strategic Plan with the MOH, which constitutes a basis
for the MOH's continued purchasing of services from the hospital.  To encourage use of
public hospitals, the MOH insurance scheme is available to only 15% of private hospital
bed capacity, while it covers 75% of public hospital bed capacity.  Today, hospitals are
receiving a one-time transfer ranging from 300 million to three billion Lebanese Pounds
(USD199,000.00 to USD1,989,000.00) depending on their size, to help jump-start  their
autonomous operations.  The years 1999 and 2000 are being considered by the MOH as
trial  periods  for the reform, with  the objective  of reaping  lessons of  experience  and
improving the system (Interview with Roger Sfeir, Advisor to the Minister of Health).
4.2  Describing  the  institutional  design: Principal features  of  the  legal  structure
governing corporatized hospitals
Law  #544  mandating  the  "Establishment  of  Public  Enterprises  for  the
Management of Ministry of  Public Health Hospitals" was promulgated  in  1996.  The
simple  three-page  document  outlining  this  law  is  followed  by  five  Implementation
Decrees that lay out the technical details and instructions for applying the law.  Laws are
voted on in Parliament.  Implementation Decrees are drafted by the ministry concerned,
in  consultation with  legal, administrative, and  financial experts in the various  sectors,
9  The remnaining  10% is to be covered from the hospitals' profit margins.
10  Given the geopolitical nature of public hospital care provision in Lebanon, the  closing down of
unprofitable hospitals would be rationally desirable, but politically difficult.20
including the Ministry of Finance, and then submitted for ratification by the Council of
Ministers.
Law #544 mandates the followingi I:
1  A public enterprise  (also, "public health enterprise", or "public hospital
board"  in this paper) is to  be founded to manage  each public hospital in the country.
Public health enterprises are to enjoy financial and managerial autonomy, subject to the
supervision of the Ministry of Health.  Such enterprises are subject to regulation by the
Ministry of Finance, the General Accounting Office, and the Central Inspection Office.
2  The revenues  of  such public  enterprises are  constituted of:  (a)  central
government transfers; (b) fees for services; (c) other sources.
3  The Ministry of Health's responsibilities include the definition of sectoral
strategy, the coordination of health provision at the national level and the rationalization
of the sector.
4  The  drafting  of  five  Implementation  Decrees  defining:  (a)  The
Appointment of Boards of Directors and Ministry Representatives; (b) Financial Regimes
for Public Hospital Enterprises;  (c) Personnel  Matters; (d) Compensation;  (e) Internal
Administration of Public Hospital Enterprises.
5  The determination of fees for services, patient contributions  to fees and
budgetary matters, including MOH transfers to public hospitals.
"1  The following items are translated from the Arabic text of Law #544.21
6  The Minister of Health's  responsibilities and prerogatives in establishing
collaborative  agreements  among public  health  enterprises, and between  public  health
enterprises and medical schools domestically and internationally.
7  The determination of the size of boards of directors for public enterprises.
8  The establishment  of a consultative committee to  study the impact and
implementation of public hospital autonomy.
The law contains two additional Items, 9 and  10, mandating the drafting of the
five Implementation Decrees defined in Item 4 above, and activating Law #544 upon its
publication in the Official Journal, respectively.
4.3  The lynchpin  of the system: The Governance Decree and its implications
The decree outlining conditions for The Appointment of Boards of Directors and
Ministry  Representatives  (henceforth, the  "Governance  Decree")  determines the  size,
composition, prerogatives and MOH representation on/oversight of public health boards.
The detailed content of the decree underscores the centrality of the board to the operation
of corporatized hospitals, and the importance of its governing mechanisms in advancing
or retarding the goals of efficiency and coordination.  Some elements of the Governance
Decree  are  important  to  examine  in  light  of  Decree  #  4517  (1972)  --  the  legal
underpinning which  defines the establishment  and operations  of all Public Enterprises
and Autonomous Agencies.  The following discussion draws on both decrees to analyze
salient aspects of the institutional design of public hospital governance.  The particular
elements that are important in this context include:
Stakeholder (principal) mix22
The  decree  stipulates  that  board  members  should  have  a  background  in
medicine, business administration,  finance, law, or public health.  However, apart
from listing a restricted set of possible specializations, the decree does not ensure that
board members have the required skills to represent (at least the most important and
obvious) stakeholders, such as the user community, medical staff in the hospital, the
MOH, ...etc.  Hence, the focus is more on defining eligibility to the board, than on
ensuring representativeness on the board.
Manner of appointment of board members (principals)
The process of selecting board members is highly ambiguous.  Provision #2
stipulates that the board is appointed upon the recommendation of the MOH through
a decree to be ratified by the Council of Ministers.  Among the important issues to
clarify are: how the MOH forms the list to be  submitted for ratification, what  the
criteria used are, and how  immune from  adverse political influence the  system is,
keeping  in  mind  that  responsiveness  and  accountability  to  political  demands  are
desirable  features.  Empirical  and  implementation  evidence  to  date  point  to
unclear/inadequate criteria in  the selection process,  as well as politicization  in the
choice of candidates, which have led to the administrative paralysis of some newly
inaugurated and much needed hospitals.  One important reason for this paralysis has
been the lack of coordination between board members.  The system places a large
onus  on  the  Minister  of  Health  to  select  the  right  people  and  negotiate  their
appointment.23
The hospital manager (agent)
The manner of appointing hospital managers is unclear.  Although the decree
does  state  that  the hospital  manager  is to  be  appointed by  the hospital  board,  it
contains no further detail on the selection and appointment process. 12 Furthermore,
the practice has ranged from the board making recommendations that the MOH may
or may not accept, to a local political leader submitting one name to the Minister of
Health,  who  then  recommends  the  appointment without  consulting  with  Ministry
cadres nor with the hospital board, nor with the MOH division in charge of public
hospitals.  The  hospital  manager  sits on  the board  of  directors ex  officio  and  is
responsible  for  the  day-to-day  running  of  the  hospital.  Because  of  his/her
informational advantage, he/she has the potential of wielding important influence on
the board, despite his/her non-voting position.
*  The extent of MOH regulatory responsibility decentralized to the board
In sharp contrast to the weak structure described above, the responsibilities of
the board  are fairly  significant.  The board  and hospital manager's  responsibilities
range  from  setting  the  policy  and  administrative  direction  of  the  hospital,  to
overseeing inpatient and outpatient service provision, quality control, cooperation and
collaboration with  educational organizations, setting policy  and strategy for various
departments within the hospital, setting the annual strategic plan and budget for the
hospital,  and  overseeing  contracts  and  collaboration  with  the  private  sector
(Translated from the Governance Decree).
12  Decree #4517 states that the director is to be appointed by the Council of Ministers  upon the
recommendation  of the relevant sectoral  ministry,  in this case the MOH. This Decree also stipulates  that
the salary of the director is set by the Council of Ministers.24
Although, as this list shows, the board has extensive responsibilities, there are
few areas in which the board and management can make decisions without clearance
from  higher level  authorities.  In only  four out of twenty decision rights/areas of
responsibility  devolved to the board by the Finance Decree, can the board  actually
make decisions without clearance from either the MOH or the Ministry of Finance, or
both (Mubarak,  1999). These are instances of transfer of responsibility without the
transfer of full authority, and they weaken incentives for optimal decision making.
*  Sectoral oversight, or accountability between MOH and hospital
The  MOH  oversees  the  day-to-day  operation  of  the  hospital  through  its
principal and voting member of the board - the ministry delegate (or representative).
This principal's  objective is to influence the operation of the board, by aligning the
hospital manager's  incentives with those of the MOH, thereby ensuring that sectoral
standards and priorities are satisfied at the hospital level.  The MOH's  oversight and
regulatory functions, carried out partly through the MOH delegate, are well laid out in
Decree #4517.
*  Appointment of MOH delegate
Similar to the ambiguity surrounding the appointment of the hospital director,
it is not clear how the MOH delegate is appointed.  Provision #10 in the decree only
defines two aspects of this appointment: the five-year term and the requirement that
the delegate be a MOH civil servant of a certain grade or above.  Crucial issues such
as how this person is selected, how close to some key functions of the administration
such as finance and procurement he/she can be, what his/her relationship to the local
and/or political  community  should  or  should  not  be,  or  at  least,  his/her  area  of25
specialization,  receive  no  mention.  As  a  result,  despite  the  fact  that  all  MOH
delegates to hospital boards enjoy the same set of decision rights and one vote on the
board, some of them can exert an excessive degree of influence on the hospital, anid
others not enough.
Risk transfer
Similar to the ambiguity surrounding the appointment of board  members, a
degree of  ambiguity surrounds  the degree of  risk borne  by  board  members,  the
hospital director and the MOH delegate for the performance of the hospital.  Apart
from  defining  board  member  remuneration  per  meeting,  the  decree  makes  nIo
mention  of the consequences of bad performance.  As a result, both in regards to
term  renewal  and  in  regards  to  compensation,  the  financial  risk  of  hospital
insolvency on the hospital board appears to be zero.  Given local conditions and the
unfavorable  reputation  of  the  public  sector  in  Lebanon  today,  the  reputational
consequences that hospital managers and board members bear can also be relatively
minor.
In summary, the institutional structure of corporatization in Lebanon is strong in
some  areas  and  weak  in  others.  It  is  strong  (and  ambitious)  in  that  it  seeks  to
deconcentrate a significant degree of administrative, fiscal and regulatory responsibility
from the central administration  of the MOH down to the hospital  level.  Reallocating
decision rights down to the level of agents with the information needed to make decisions
is  a way  of  improving  organizational  output.  On the other  hand,  the  design  of  the
Lebanese  system  is weak  because  it  is replete  with  ambiguities  that  allow  for much
variance  in  outcomes  depending  on  the  personalities  in  place.  This  is  particularly26
apparent in the choice of principals, the choice of the agent and the definition of their
decision rights.
4.4  Examining  partial empirical  evidence
The  following  discussions  are based  on  two  illustrative provisions  from  two
decrees: the Decree on Finance and the Decree on Personnel.  I analyze the provisions to
understand whether the extent to which the system in Lebanon can generate Dixit's  third
best, how much of this  is due  to lack of principal coordination, and to point to  other
factors  that  might  be  at  play.'3 For the  purposes  of  this  analysis, we  take  Dixit's
conclusions on the making of economic policy as a point of departure: the difficulty of
achieving good perfornance  in government is due to the fact that principals tend to be
uncoordinated, incentives weak,  and outcomes third best.  The question then becomes
how uncoordinated principals on Lebanese hospital boards are in practice, and what can
be done to improve the equilibrium.
In  Table  2  below,  the  "expected  outcome"  listed  in  the  second  column,
corresponds to the "policy action" in the same row, mandated by the decree. I treat the
expected outcomes as hypotheses for how the system  can be  expected to behave,  and
provide, following the table, a discussion of the degree to which the empirical evidence to
date supports the hypotheses.  The Policy Options presented in the first column of Table
2 are taken from Provision #14 in the Decree on Finance, which mandates the possible
actions a manager can take in case of hospital budget deficit.  The Policy Options (1-5)
constitute  recommendations  that  the  hospital  manager  can  make  to  the  board,  to
13  Using the Decree on Boards of Directors as a baseline, a similar analysis can be carried out on the
remaining decrees.27
cut/control  costs (Translation  from the Decree  on Finance,  Provision  #14). Provision  #14
was selected  for this analysis  because it touches upon a broad  range of management  and
finance decisions, and because the policy options it offers are amenable to analysis as
hypotheses  about the behavior  of the system.28
Table  2:  Identifying  outcomes  based  on the  Decree  on Finance
Policy  Options  Expected  Outcome  and  Empirical  Findings
for  Hospital  Brief  Reasoning
Boards
1. Recommending  Expected: Excessive fee  Outcomes 1. and 2. have occurred in some hospitals,
an increase in fees  increases.  but not in others.  They have not occurred where
Reason: No community  board members are also members of the community,
representative on the board.  originating and residing in the community.
On the other hand, these policy options have been a
2. Recommflendintg  Expected: Patient contributions  problem where none of the board members are
an increase in  could be set too high.  selected from the community, especially not the
pantincrase  in  culdbe  et to  hgh.hospital  director.
patients'  Reason: No community
contributions  to  representative on the board.
fees
3. Deciding to  This coordination problem is resolved at the level of the central administration of the
increasefees  MOH, which sets rates to be charged to insurance companies by all public hospitals.  In
charged to  practice, because policy option 3 is difficult (and impracticable) to implement at the
insurance agencies.  level of a hospital board, it is a very weak (or "hollow") decision right.  The author of
policy option 3 assumed an imperfection in the insurance market that is resolvable
through regulation at the level of the public hospital board.  The MOH's retention of a
central decision right over such an issue, if a market imperfection indeed exists, is a
good idea for a small country like Lebanon where regional idiosyncrasies and the need
to adapt to differential market conditions are relatively minor.
4. Deciding  to  Ex-oected:  Frequent  Decision right not implemented in any of the
hospitals to date.  Reasons are fear of social sanction
increasefirst-class  implementation of this option.  and the reticence to develop a reputation of being
hospital  fees.  Reason: Lack of community  expensive, while the goal is to encourage use of
representation on the board.  public hospitals..
5. Recommending  Expected: Strong influence of  Although none of the corporatized hospitals have
to MOH and MOF  MOH delegate on the board  resorted to this policy option to date, interviewees
that the deficit be  could rule this out every time,  have mentioned and expressed concern for influence
covered through  even when necessary.  Weak  in both directions, depending on the MOH delegate
reservefunds.  influence of the MOH on the  appointed.
board could ratify such
recommendations, when they are
not necessary.
Reason: Possible randomness
with which MOH delegate is
selected.29
It is interesting to note that policy options 1 and 2 did not result in the expected
outcomes in hospitals where board members are also members of the community served
by  the hospital.  Social sanction, reputation, and  a degree of altruism have prevented
board  members  from raising  fees (Interviews with board  members  1-7).  In the case
where the hospital director and board members are not from the community, complaints
have been filed by patients that hospital fees are too high.  These results shed interesting
insights  on  the  way  we  might  think  of  principals  and  principal  coordination.  The
Lebanese  hospital  boards  do  not  include  a  community representative,  while  in  other
countries  such  as Columbia  and  France, the  boards  include  an  elected  or  appointed
community representative (Discussions with health policy experts from New Zealand and
France, 1997/1998).  However, as the case of Lebanon illustrates, the physical presence
of a community representative is not necessary if community "interests" are represented.
This is an especially interesting proposition if the objective is to keep boards small, for
reasons I will discuss below.'4
Policy  option  3 presents  an  example where  the presence  of  a principal  is not
necessary if the coordination problem is resolved at a higher level in the administration.
Hence, although  insurance companies  are important stakeholders in  a hospital  system
(Savage, et al., 1997), the case of Lebanon provides  an example of their interests being
represented through means other than a principle, further reducing the need for principle
coordination on a board.
14  Furthermore, if we are exclusively concerned with coordination, it appears preferable to exclude
the community from the board, such that the agent (hospital director) is certain to respond to the MOH's
incentive to reduce cost.  The agent's  problem then  becomes  that of  fulfilling  the right  social  welfare
function (because they are not alerted to community needs), but the board would be more coordinated.30
Policy option 4 presents a decision right that has not been exercised to date, and is
unlikely to be exercised because public hospital users are by definition those who seek to
pay the lowest possible prices for health care, even if they can afford to pay higher rates
(Interviews with board members 1-6 & 8).  On the rare occasions when first class service
has  been  requested,  the  MOH  recommendation for  first  class  fees has  been  applied
because the community members  of the hospital board have not wanted to be seen as
trying to exploit patients who could otherwise afford to seek private  sector care.  They
have also done this in order to encourage people to use public hospitals.  Again, social
sanction and reputation have played an important role to date, and good business skills
have certainly contributed.  The reticence to exploit this provision is an indication that in
some  instances,  the  manner  in  which  principals  are  appointed  has  contributed  to
controlling the price of care charged to patients.15 Policy outcome 4 raises  questions
similar to those discussed above, with respect to how one might define who the principals
are, and how important it is for all of them to influence the agent directly.
For policy option 5, the closer the MOH delegate is to the treasury and finance
functions of the MOH, the more influence he/she can wield in this very important area
(Interviews with board  members  1-11).  The  amount of  finance  a hospital  has partly
determines  the degree  to  which  the hospital  can pursue  aggressive development  and
capital investment strategies.  Access to finance and a tight reign over use of finance are
necessary for survival in the face of stiff private sector competition.  A similar (predicted)
result also applies to two other decision rights not listed in the table: the right to request a
treasury loan (option 6) and the right to request a private sector loan (option 7).  None of
1  5  The reticence  to  charge high  fees  may  also  have a  positive  impact  on  equity  considerations,
although this work cannot substantiate it.31
the  hospitals  corporatized  to  date  have  attempted  to  exercise  these  rights,  however
interviewees expected the same type of influence to result from the mix of principals
present on the hospital board." 6
4.5  Placing the evidence in perspective
Over  a  decade  ago,  as  the health  care  market  became more  competitive  and
accelerated  the  drive  toward  organizational  forms that  split  purchaser  from provider
functions, the literature on hospital board effectiveness in US markets listed a number of
challenges (Shortell,  1989).  As hospitals moved from relatively benign to competitive
environments, they  needed smaller, more nimble and risk-taking boards,  composed of
members that were focused on strategy, specific expertise, evaluation and accountability.
These boards  are  closer  to  the boards  of  competitive  firms  than  to  the benevolent,
community  notable-type  boards  of  hospitals  in  previous,  less  demanding  market
environments (Shortell, 1989; Kovner 1985; Delbecq & Gill 1988; Weiner & Alexander
1993).  Since the late 1980s, non-profit boards across sectors have moved in the direction
outlined then, and the focus continues to be on smaller-sized boards with fewer insiders,
and responsibilities  related more to  the ratification  and monitoring  of  policy, than  to
direct involvement in specific operations (Taylor, Chait & Holland  1996)  Hospitals in
Lebanon are facing a similar set of challenges, among them:
*  Managing diverse groups of stakeholders (principals);
*  Involving physicians in the management and governance process;
16  The  analysis  carried  out based  on  Table  2  can be  extended  to  other areas  of  hospital board
decisions using the remainder of the Finance Decree in addition to the Internal Administration, Personnel,
and  Compensation Decrees, to  a larger  and  more detailed survey design,  from  which  I expect  broadly
similar findings.  Extensions of this  work would be helpful  in substantiating testable hypotheses,  and in
developing a method for analyzing the institutional design of hospital boards.32
*  Responding to the needs of hospital restructuring;
*  Meeting the challenges of diversification;
*  Understanding and carrying out strategy formulation;
*  Balancing equity and efficiency considerations.
The design of Lebanon's  public hospital boards is similar to the "new" hospital
board in some ways, and different in other, important ways.  It is closer in its small size,
focus on  strategy,  and  representation  of  stakeholders.  It  is  further in its  capacity to
assume risk and carry out evaluation and in its accountability. The examples discussed in
Table 4 bring the capacities of the Lebanese boards to bare in ways that I expand upon
below.
For  example,  despite  the  fact that  public  hospital  boards  in  Lebanon  do not
include a member who is officially appointed as "community representative", commnunity
representation is not compromised because some board members fulfill a dual function
of, for example, "doctor"  and  "community  representative."  This  manner  of selecting
board members resolves part of the principal coordination problem while helping keep
the board size to a minimum.  In moving toward more technocratic boards, it is important
to ensure that the community continue to be represented on the board in some manner,
without expanding the size of the board significantly.  In a similar manner, policy option
3 illustrates that keeping some decision rights at the level of the central ministry serves to
unify policy and reduce costs of principal coordination, contributing to the nimbleness of
the system.
On the other hand, randomness in outcomes based on important policy options 5,
6 and 7 indicates that the system is weaker on the financial management  side, perhaps33
including  the financial accountability side, although more evidence will be required to
establish this.  What is certain is that the politicization of boards has resulted in some loss
of  transparency  and some  non-technocratic decision-making and strategy  formulation.
This suggests that public hospitals in Lebanon today may not be in the best position to
respond to the needs of restructuring and adaptation to a competitive market.
4.6  Further  evidence from  the Decree on Personnel
A reading  of an example from the Decree on Personnel serves to illustrate the
importance  of  issues  other  than  principal  coordination  in  the  design  of  hospital
governance  institutions.  These  include  simple  agency  and  information  problems that
could result in collusion, political pressure and graft.
In provisions #9-11, the decree states that applicants for hospital vacancies must
be ranked based on performance on an exam.  The hospital board holds the decision right
to arrange to carry out the exam.  By virtue of his e-x  officio position on the board, the
hospital manager is a  co-holder of the decision right.  Given that the decree does not
specify any details with respect to the manner in which the exam or examiner is to be
selected,  the  ambiguity  has  resulted  in  solutions  inferior  to  first  best.  A  first  best
outcome  could  be  characterized  as  one  where  the  hospital  board,  taking  into
consideration manager(s) recommendations, short-lists a set of possible examiners, and in
consultation with  experts  in  the  field,  selects  the best  possible  one,  ensuring  proper
screening  in  its  recruitment  process.  Agency  and  information  problems  (but  not
coordination problems) likely to prevent this  first best  outcome from occurring include
collusion between some board members and the manager at the expense of other board
members.  This could influence the choice of examiner, in the absence of criteria for this34
choice.  The influence could include political pressure through one of the principals on
the hospital board to favor applicants from specific political or religious backgrounds.
Under  this scenario, outcomes inferior to first best include instances where the
decision  is  made  to  grant the  contract to  an  examiner with  a  lower benchmark  for
"successful"  performance.  In this  case, an exam would have been carried  out, but the
pool  of applicants  from which the final choice of employee will be made  is of lower
average quality,  and criteria other than performance on the exam will carry larger real
weight.  Another outcome  inferior to first best could be  one where both the choice of
examiner  and  the choice  of  exam are determined  in  ways that maximize  chances of
success for less competitive applicant profiles.  In this  case, the use of an exam as a
screening device would have failed.
Empirically, there have been three different applications of these decision rights
to date.  In one case, the hospital manager and some board members agreed to disregard
the examination requirement  and established their own point system for the ranking of
applicants for positions.  This system has not served the hospital well, and has resulted in
a number of physicians it wishes to dismiss because of malpractice, and one lawsuit as a
result of a dismissal.  Among those who were hired, there is evidence that the powerful
political appointees to the board had an overwhelming  degree of influence on the final
choice of candidates (Interviews with board members 2-5).
In another hospital, the director of the board is wondering how many competitors
he is likely to have for the positions the distant rural hospital is looking to fill.  When
asked about whether and how his board will comply with the requirement to carry out an
exam, he said that they would probably put together a pro forma  writing and interview35
exam  for  those  who  do  apply, to  be  evaluated by  the board  (Interviews with  board
members 6-7).  A third hospital has selected an outside screening committee that is likely
to achieve an outcome closest to first best.  At the time of this writing, the hiring process
was just beginning and no further information was available.
Mechanisms that would improve this outcome include amending the Decree cn
Corporate Boards to minimize the chance of collusion between board members and the
hospital manager(s),  and  to minimize  pressure for political  appointments. This  would
affect  appointment  rights  as  well as  decision  rights.  However,  given  the inevitabie
presence of some political interference in multi-confessional countries like Lebanon, aid
differential powers on the part of principals to influence the agent, minimal criteria ior
the selection of the examiner and exam would move the outcome closer to first best.  But
if a net improvement in the allocation of decision rights is not  feasible at this level. a
possible solution would be to reallocate the decision right over exams to a regional or
central level, where transparent  and technocratic selection of examiners  can be carried
out.  Principals represented  on the board  would then retain  decision rights  over other
aspects  of  screening  that  are related  to  local  specificities  and  needs,  even  political
preferences within technocratically circumscribed limits.  The local choice of candidates
would be  made from  a  short list compiled at the national  level.  The short listing of
candidates  would  effectively  provide  two  levels  of  screening  and  scrutiny  whic'-,
combined  with  visibility  and  transparency,  would  prevent  egregious  errors  from
occurring.  Countries such as New Zealand and the UK have resorted to similar solutiolns
for the appointment of staff to corporatized entities." 7
17  Yet another solution could be to do away with the examination requirement all together, as is done
in the private  sector, and  replace  it with screening  instruments  set by  each  hospital individually.  The36
5.  Problems emanatingfrom  the system 's institutional design
In this section, I synthesize the evidence to date in answer to questions the theory
can help inform.  I underscore the importance of Dixit's  model to some areas, and show
how simple agency, influence and information costs are inherent to institutional design in
other areas.  I also offer some preliminary answers to the questions raised in section 2.1
about the design of corporatization.
Representation of key principals/stakeholders
On the one hand, there is some evidence that the main principals, are fairly well
represented on Lebanese public hospital boards de facto,  even if they are not represented
de jure.  The size and composition of the board parallels fairly well what is suggested in
the empirical literature on new, strategy-oriented boards in hospitals.  There arguably is
some room for enlarging the Lebanese boards slightly, from an average of four members
to  six,  which  is  closer  to  the  average  in  non-profit  hospital  boards  internationally.
Enlarging the size of boards would  allow for a stronger presence  for some principals,
and/or broader representation of principals.
On the other hand,  the lack of strict criteria  in the selection of principals  and
differences in appointment rights and power can affect outcomes in a significant way, and
are problems of design  beyond the principal  coordination problem.  The result is that
even when the important principals are represented de jure,  the coordination problem is
still not necessarily  resolved because of the differential  capacity of principals  to exert
influence over the agent.
experience  with the point system in one public hospital however  indicates that the easy politicization of
what  are  still considered  "public  sector jobs"  may  preclude  the  proper  operation of  market-like hiring
practices in a country where the religio-political map is still expected to be reflected in the distribution of
public sector jobs.37
The currency of influence
In the  case of Lebanon,  three currencies of influence appear to  determine the
power of principals over the agent.  Although this appears to be changing today as the
new  presidential  administration  accelerates  the  push  for  public  sector  reform  and
accountability.  The order  in which the currencies are discussed reflects their  relative
importance.  The first is political.  Appointees of political leaders have tended to wield
the most  significant influence by any measure.  The second  is informational,  a result
found by Aghion and Tirole (1997) in private organizations.  The third is technocratic,
granting those with  skills and experience some leverage over the direction of policy on
the board.'8
Two  aspects of the manner  in which  currencies  of influence work  in hospital
boards in Lebanon are important.  First, combinations of two types of currencies are what
tend  to  empower  principals  most.  As  such,  political  and  informational  currencies
combined have wielded virtually uncontested influence over the agent.  Combinations of
political and technocratic currencies have also been fairly powerful.  The informational
and  technocratic  currencies  on  their  own have  yielded  fairly  low-powered  incentive
schemes.  The relative importance of these two has been a function of the personalities in
place.  The political currency on its own has been an important source of influence, but
this may be changing today.  The relative importance of currencies of influence is a good
proxy for the relative influence of appointment rights that principals have when they act
on the board.
8  The analysis  of power  wielded  through  property  rights (decision  rights)  is not a new subject. See
Polenske  (1999)  for an insightful  discussion  of the relationship  between  different  types of power,  property38
Decision rights
Some decision rights are expansive, while others are fairly circumscribed.  For
example, by virtue of the fact that they are minimally defined, decision rights over hiring
transfer all authority over  hiring to the hospital board, thereby devolving a  significant
degree  of  power  to  the  board.  On  the  other  hand,  while  the  responsibility  over
procurement  is  devolved  to  the  board,  the  authority  devolved  to  board  members  is
circumscribed by virtue of the fact that decision rights are co-held with the MOH and
Ministry  of  Finance,  through  a  series  of  controls,  mostly  ex  ante.  Such  "weak"
devolution of decision rights might have been intended as a mechanism of controlling
agency problems when board members do not bear the risk of procurement decisions, but
it  is  not  clear  that  this  indirect  mechanism  will  achieve  its  objectives  without
compromising others, such as agility and adaptability to demand.  Instead, some level of
direct financial risk (and benefit) might be transferred to the level of the hospital manager
and board, further strengthening the power of the MOH to influence the hospital on the
cost control side.
Improving the coordination ofprincipals
The types of policy measures that can improve the coordination of principals, and
consequently the outcomes, have to do both with appointment rights and decision rights.
More  homogeneous  appointment  rights  can decrease  the  variability  of  the  power  of
incentive schemes that principals can exert over  the agent.  Such measures can range
from a more transparent,  technocratic and systematic screening and selection of board
members,  to  the  development  of  a  public  sector  corporate  culture  combining  the
rights and development strategies.  Contributors to this topic, discussed by Polenske, range from Marx
(1967 [1888]) to Parsons (1963) to Poulantzaz (1973) to Weber (1978), and Bowles & Gintis (1986).39
Weberian and Krepsian notions.  While it is important not to overestimate the degree to
which the "personality effect" can be controlled, some reduction in arbitrariness is clearly
possible in the case of Lebanon.  This could either be achieved through benevolent and
enlightened  top-down  selection  of  candidates  for  positions  (as  the  government  is
attempting  to  do  today) or through  the  establishment  of institutions  that guarantee  a
minimum degree of continuity across political regimes.
In  the  area  of  decision  rights  allocations,  withdrawing  some  decision  rights  all
together  from the level of the hospital board,  and reallocating them to the level of the
central  administration  or  some  other third  body  can  serve  to  decrease  the  need  for
coordination among principals.  For example, in instances where unanimity (or at least a
super-majority decision) is desirable but cannot be guaranteed by the board, decisions are
perhaps best taken outside the board.
The proclaimed objectives of corporatization
From  the  case  of  Lebanon,  there  is  evidence  that  the  cost-quality  coordination
problem is difficult to resolve.  In cases where the cost of care has been kept low, there
have been complaints about quality.  In cases where  quality has been improving over
time,  evidenced by demand for the hospital's  services, there have been complaints that
costs  are too high.  This  may well be  a perennial  problem  for hospital  management
worldwide.  The data collected  for this  paper does not allow for stronger conclusions
about the situation in Lebanon.
What is certain is that the difficulty of achieving this balance in Lebanon is partly due
to  the lack of  transfer of financial risk  from  corporatization.  Although  the law  does40
specify that hospitals are to be financially solvent (after an initial transitional period), it
does not  indicate what the consequences of violating budget constraints are for board
members and the MOH delegate on the board.  By default, the risk of financial default is
assumed by the MOH, the recurrence of which would presumably cause the hospital to be
shut  down.  There  are  no  explicit  financial  incentives relating,  for  example,  salary
bonuses to cost containment that could improve the expected outcome.  This is one of
many design deficiencies outside the scope of the principal coordination problem, which
will need to be handled through the amendment of the Implementation Decrees.
The power of incentives
The  power  of  incentives  is  high  in  terms  of  the  agent's  response  to  some
principals in some cases.  For example, hospitals whose board members are chosen from
the community, tend to have boards that are sensitive to social sanction.  This is not the
case in hospitals whose boards are selected from outside the community, where increases
in  fees  have  been  easy  to  implement,  and  have  resulted  in  complaints  from  the
community.  In terms of the  financial solvency of the hospital, incentives  tend to  be
relatively  low powered  across the board  for reasons  discussed  above.  This outcome
corroborates the  low-risk, low power  of incentives conclusion  from the moral  hazard
model.
6.  Concluding remarks: from  theory to practice and back
This  paper  has  proposed  the  common-agency  multitasking  approach  as  an
analytical  lens  to  understand  the  problem  of  board  design  in  corporatized  public
hospitals.  On the theoretical side, it has shown that while principal coordination is indeed
a problem, a more detailed and variegated approach is necessary to understand problems41
of govemance when the model is applied to a micro-organizational setting.  In particular,
a closer understanding of differential capacities on the part of principals to influence the
agent, and the various currencies of influence appear key to a more detailed modeling of
the problem.  On the empirical side, the application of the multi-tasking common agency
model has  raised questions  that shed light on some  ideas for the improvement of the
institutional  design of public hospital corporatization in Lebanon.  These ideas are the
subject  of  a  different,  policy-oriented  paper.  They  have  been  partially  included  in
summary form as part of Appendix B.42
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1.  Overview and policy issues
The  health  sector  is  among  the  most  complex  and  pressing  aspects  of
administrative reform in Lebanon today, not only because of the urgency of curbing the
excessively high costs of the sector, but also because the reform proposes new legislation
which is to form the basis of an institutional structure changing the operation of all public
hospitals in the country.  The objective of the new institutional  structure is to improve
quality of service in public hospitals (and cut costs in the sector) by granting hospitals a
degree of managerial and financial autonomy from the Ministry of Health (MOH).  Of
great  currency worldwide  but  faced with  mixed  results,  this  type of  reform is being
referred  to  internationally  as "corporatization"  and  is understood  as a middle  ground
between public sector ownership and management, and privatization.
This note summarizes preliminary findings based on work carried out on to date,
and makes recommendations on how to proceed.  The work entailed (1) analysis of the
decrees of application under Law 544 governing public hospital autonomy; (2) interviews
with ministry officials and hospital staff and users, and; (3) site visits.  The questions I
asked through this work have to do with:
*  The appropriateness of the new structure given macro considerations  in the health
sector and given lessons learned from the experiments with autonomy that preceded
the new Law #544 governing public hospital autonomy;
*  Progress  and  obstacles  in  implementation  given  the  experiences  to  date  of  two
hospitals,  Nabatiyye  and  Tannourine,  and  of  Dahr  el-Bashek,  a  hospital  that
attempted  autonomy  through  a  public-private  association,  before  Law  #544  was
passed.
2.  Overview offindings  to date
What follows is a summary assessment of the reform:
1.  There exist various gaps in the decrees of application, such as lack of clarity on
lines of accountability between public hospital boards and the Ministry of Health,
and between hospital directors and hospital boards.49
2.  There are implicit contradictions in the spirit of the law.  For example, while some
provisions in the decree  on finance are clear in  the establishment of numerous
MOH controls over revenue and expenditure decisions of hospitals and hospital
boards, other provisions appear to grant virtually free reign over the transfer of
use and ownership of the physical assets of public hospitals.
3.  The new autonomous structure is vulnerable to political influence, which appears
to  have  affected implementation  in  the case of two hospitals,  Tannourine and
Nabatiyye.  Politicization derives partly from the manner in which hospital boards
are appointed, the  size of hospital boards  and their  terms, the mechanisms  of
coordination between the MOH and hospital boards (through the person of the
ministry representative), and various insufficiently defined oversight functions of
the MOH.
4.  Lack  of  clarity  on  the  objectives  and  implementation  details  of  autonomy.
Among the important actors that remain unclear about the reforms are Ministry of
Health  middle managers  and those  below  them,  public hospital  managers  and
those below  them who are not yet fully aware of the content  of the decrees of
application of the new law governing autonomous hospitals.
5.  Insufficient  exploitation  of  lessons learned  from  the  "informal"  experience in
public  hospital  autonomy prior  to  Law No.  544.  For instance,  one  important
conclusion from the analysis of the experience of the Support Committee of the
Hospital of Dahr el-Bachek is that the five-member board, meeting twice a month,
had hardly enough time to address all important policy matters facing the hospital.
Given this statement by various members of the retired Support Committee, it is
not clear  how a board  of three members  for hospitals  of under  100 beds  (the
majority of hospitals in the country) is expected to be sufficient.
6.  Furthermnore,  and related to point 5., preliminary findings point to the fact that in
most  countries  where  public  institutions  are vulnerable  to  "political  capture",
boards are constituted such that  a number of spots are reserved for "political"
appointments,  while  a  number  of  other  spots  is  reserved  for  "technocratic"
appointments, guaranteeing a balanced mix between important political interests
and rational policy decisions.  Implementing such an idea in not beyond reach for
a country like Lebanon.
7.  Finally, the above, in addition to readings of the decrees lead to the conclusion
that the conceptual underpinning, or model for the proposed reforms is unclear.
Information I have been provided through interviews indicates that the French and
Tunisian  models might  have been  drawn upon.  It  is not  clear why these  in
particular would have been selected, nor is it clear that any other lessons learned
from international experience have been exploited in conceptualizing the Lebanon
reforms.
3.  Why not just  do away with public hospitals?
The reason why total privatization of health delivery should not be an option in
Lebanon goes beyond the standard public good/equity considerations.  The linchpin of an
effective  system  of  private  delivery  of  public  services  is  strong regulatory  capacity,
which  we  lack  in  Lebanon.  Instead, the  Lebanese  public  sector  has  proven  to  be
vulnerable  and  fertile  ground  for  the  politicization  and  corruption  of  individual50
transactions, especially when they are relatively small and numerous, which is the reason
why expenditures on the cost reimbursement system in the MOH increased exponentially
in the past 7 years.  The granting and oversight of contracts under  a privatized system
requires a regulatory system that is accountable, and that benefits from reliable quality
and performance measures.  Given the existing regulatory weakness of the MOH, it is not
clear that such a system will be instituted and can be effective.
On the other hand,  bad public  health provision  will cast further  doubt on  the
capacity of Lebanese public hospitals to deliver such services, and will strengthen the
rationale for privatization.  Seen from this perspective, a strong and carefully crafted set
of decrees of application governing autonomous hospitals is crucial.  To achieve this, an
interim revision and restructuring of the current decrees is of priority today.  Continuing
with  the decrees  we have recently passed  will not  only create weak  and  difficult-to-
regulate public hospitals, it will also put in place and entrench local interests that will be
difficult to  remove  once we  have even clearer  evidence of the  structure's  weakness,
probably two years into implementation.
4.  What remains to be done
- A  fresh  reading  of  the  decrees  of  application  in  view  of  the  uncertainties,
complications and obstacles on the ground to date.  As I suggest this, I acknowledge
the great deal of work that has clearly been put into the current versions of the decrees
of application.  What is unfortunate is that the few weaknesses they contain happen to
be key determinants of success under the new regime.
- A  review  of  most  relevant  international  experiences  in  this  area  to  date,  and
incorporation  of  appropriate  lessons  of  this  experience  into  the  refining  and
implementation of institutions of autonomy in the public health sector in  Lebanon.
Many of the questions currently being posed in Lebanon have already been posed and
resolved elsewhere. While it is important to pay attention to the particularities of the
Lebanese case, there is no need to "reinvent the wheel" for all aspects of the reform.
*  The above review would need to be carried out in tandem with discussions/revisits of
current macro-considerations  in the sector, knowing that such considerations might
have evolved since the initial discussions of Law #544.  To illustrate, it makes no
sense trying to adjust details of the governance and  operation of a public hospital
without ensuring that such adjustmnents  are in line with  a clear and well-articulated
strategy  that  accounts  for  the public  hospital  implementation  constraints  we  are
encountering on the ground.51
9  Appendix B
PRELIMINARY  IDEAS  FOR  THE  REFORM  OF  THE  PUBLIC  HOSPITAL
CORPORATIZATION IMPLEMENTATION DECREES UNDER LAW #544 IN
LEBANON.
1  To correct for problems of principal collusion and graft, revise the structure of
boards  and  define  prerogatives  better.  Perhaps  rotate  the  presidency  of  boards  to
minimize  concentration  of power and collusion between board  and manager.  Also re-
think length of terms and conditions for reappointment.
2  To improve probability of principal coordination, establish a system of Rules of
Order for board meetings such that important policy matters are guaranteed due process
in discussions.  Incorporate a quorum requirement into Decree on Boards of Directors.
3  To resolve some collective action problems, ensure that certain decision rights are
allocated to agents outside/above the board, especially when unanimity is important, but
cannot be guaranteed through the board.
4  Institute training and continuing professional education for board members.  This
would contribute to the coordination of principals through the development of a common
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